However whereas the problem of constructing an optimal contract with subjective evaluation (which is defined simply as a signal in most papers) receives a large attention, firm-level evaluation Downloadable (with restrictions)! This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjective evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures. Moreover, discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance, suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for NBER Program(s):Labor Studies Program, Technical Working Papers. We introduce a general Principal-Agent model with subjective evaluation and malfeasance characterized by two-sided asymmetric information on performance that allows for an arbitrary information structure. Two generic contract forms are studied. Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation Revisited Kong-Pin Chen Chien-Lung Cheny Szu-Hsien Hoz May 19, 2016 Abstract This paper revisits the property of the optimal contract of a static principal-agent relationship with subjective performance evaluations (MacLeod, 2003), but assuming that the principal and the agent receive correlated On Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation W. Bentley MacLeod 1 TheUniversity of Southern California Los Angeles,CA 90089-0253 June 2001 1I would like to thank Canice Prendergast for suggesting this problem and for helpful comments on a first draft. I also greatly appreciated the comments of Janet Currie and Jonathan Levin, and thank Mehdi Farsi for excellent Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation. This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjecti~~e evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case ~ith~,er(fiableperformance measures.
the value of subjective performance indicators for contracting purposes, the loss MacLeod, W. (2003), 'Optimal contracting with subjective evaluation'.
15 Nov 2011 constraint will be violated (unless the optimal contract asks for a # 0! depends more on the subjective evaluations obtain better evaluations. compensation contracting, suggesting that consideration of different measurement types in isolation can lead to incomplete conclusions about the optimal evidence on principals' subjective evaluations of their teachers' effectiveness using two sources of data from a Optimal contracting with subjective evaluation . baseline. The IPT, led by the Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary (Contracting) 5.1.2 Although use of award fee allows for subjective evaluation of the contractor's performance hours, etc.) to ensure the optimal capability is achieved.
Here, the optimal contract penalizes the agent only if the public output and the supervisor's evaluation are at their respective worst levels. The supervisor is
Subjective performance evaluation and optimal incentive contract. In economics, there is a large body of theoretical literature on optimal incentive contracting with both objective measures and Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation. This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjecti~~e evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case ~ith~,er(fiableperformance measures. Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation: The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile W. Bentley MacLeod and Teck Yong Tan NBER Working Paper No. 22156 April 2016 JEL No. D86,J33,J41 ABSTRACT We introduce a general Principal-Agent model with subjective evaluation and malfeasance
Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation. This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjecti~~e evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case ~ith~,er(fiableperformance measures.
However whereas the problem of constructing an optimal contract with subjective evaluation (which is defined simply as a signal in most papers) receives a large attention, firm-level evaluation Downloadable (with restrictions)! This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjective evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures. Moreover, discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance, suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for NBER Program(s):Labor Studies Program, Technical Working Papers. We introduce a general Principal-Agent model with subjective evaluation and malfeasance characterized by two-sided asymmetric information on performance that allows for an arbitrary information structure. Two generic contract forms are studied. Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation Revisited Kong-Pin Chen Chien-Lung Cheny Szu-Hsien Hoz May 19, 2016 Abstract This paper revisits the property of the optimal contract of a static principal-agent relationship with subjective performance evaluations (MacLeod, 2003), but assuming that the principal and the agent receive correlated On Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation W. Bentley MacLeod 1 TheUniversity of Southern California Los Angeles,CA 90089-0253 June 2001 1I would like to thank Canice Prendergast for suggesting this problem and for helpful comments on a first draft. I also greatly appreciated the comments of Janet Currie and Jonathan Levin, and thank Mehdi Farsi for excellent Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation. This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjecti~~e evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case ~ith~,er(fiableperformance measures. Downloadable (with restrictions)! This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjective evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures. Moreover, discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance, suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for
1 Feb 2016 In the optimal contract, the principal commits ex ante either to promote the agent and pay a high wage, or else to end the relationship by firing the
Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation Revisited Kong-Pin Chen Chien-Lung Cheny Szu-Hsien Hoz May 19, 2016 Abstract This paper revisits the property of the optimal contract of a static principal-agent relationship with subjective performance evaluations (MacLeod, 2003), but assuming that the principal and the agent receive correlated On Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation W. Bentley MacLeod 1 TheUniversity of Southern California Los Angeles,CA 90089-0253 June 2001 1I would like to thank Canice Prendergast for suggesting this problem and for helpful comments on a first draft. I also greatly appreciated the comments of Janet Currie and Jonathan Levin, and thank Mehdi Farsi for excellent Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation. This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjecti~~e evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case ~ith~,er(fiableperformance measures.